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893 
DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF THE WORK FOR HIRE 
DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECT ON TERMINATION RIGHTS 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby1 
(decided August 8, 2013) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, motion picture adaptations of childhood comic book 
heroes are major block-buster films that generate billions of dollars 
worldwide.2  As the popularity and value in creating these derivative 
works intensifies, the artists who originally drew and depicted these 
iconic characters are beginning to demand their share of the wealth.3  
Termination rights are available for an artist to take back ownership 
of the copyright he originally assigned, regardless of whether the 
work was created under the Copyright Act of 1976 or the Copyright 
Act of 1909.4  Termination rights are especially important in relation 
to derivative works because if an artist is able to terminate copy-
rights, he will be entitled to the profits if works are converted into a 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2012 in Philos-
ophy, Western New England University.  Special thanks to Professor Rena Seplowitz for 
guidance on my Note and throughout my law school career, to the Touro Law Review staff, 
especially to Tara M. Breslawski, who provided structure and valuable critiques to ensure 
the best work possible, and to my parents for always instilling confidence and pushing me to 
succeed. 
1 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-1178, 2014 WL 1275190 
(U.S. March 21, 2014) (No. 13-1178). 
2 See BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com (last visited May 2, 2014).  Iron 
Man 3, the latest Marvel movie based on a character Kirby helped create, has grossed more 
than $1.2 billion worldwide.  Iron Man 3, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.co 
m/movies/?id=ironman3.htm (last visited May 2, 2014). 
3 Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 310 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
4 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006). 
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box office success.  However, if the work is considered a work made 
for hire, the artist is no longer entitled to ownership of the work.5 
The work for hire doctrine, which is applicable to works cre-
ated under the 1976 Act and the 1909 Act, governs whether the em-
ployer of an artist is the actual owner of the copyright and the one en-
titled to all present and future rights.  The work for hire doctrine 
grants ownership rights in the copyright to the employer as the entity 
which controlled the work and took a risk creating it.6  In a conflict 
between an artist and the hiring party over ownership, various factors 
are considered in order to determine which party has an actual inter-
est in a work.  If a copyright holder did not originate a work or re-
ceive the assignment rights, it is improper for him to be the legal 
owner.  Determining whether a work is a work made for hire is a dif-
ficult task for the courts, and in Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, the 
court, once again, faced the issue of whether an artist’s work consti-
tuted a work made for hire.7 
The background of this case begins with the career of the 
famed comic book artist Jack Kirby.8  Kirby “began his career in the 
comic book business in the late 1930s.”9  Marvel Comics, founded in 
1939, contracted with Kirby in 1940 to purchase all ten issues of 
Captain America from Kirby and his business partner, Joe Simon.10  
Throughout the years, Kirby was considered a freelancer for Marvel 
because he was “not a formal employee of Marvel, and not paid a 
fixed wage or salary.  He did not receive benefits, and was not reim-
bursed for expenses or overhead in creating his drawings.”11  When 
Marvel would purchase Kirby’s work, it compensated him based on a 
per-page rate.12 
The litigation was based on the property rights of 262 works 
which Kirby created and Marvel published by Marvel between 1958 
and 1963.13  The district court was asked to determine whether Mar-
 
5 Id. 
6 See infra section IV (discussing the application of instance and expense test under the 
work for hire doctrine). 
7 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 124. 
8 Id. at 125. 
9 Id. at 124-25. 
10 Id. at 125. 
11 Id. at 125-26. 
12 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 126. 
13 Id. at 125. 
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vel or Kirby’s heirs owned the works created during that time.14  
Throughout the relevant period, Marvel’s director, Stan Lee, stated 
that he and Jack Kirby were “closely affiliated” and that he gave Jack 
Kirby a “steady stream of work.”15  Although Jack Kirby was consid-
ered a freelancer, the facts of Marvel indicate that Jack Kirby did 
most of his work with “Marvel projects in mind.”16 
A. Procedural History 
In September 2009, the children of Jack Kirby sent termina-
tion notices to various Marvel entities, purporting to end Marvel’s as-
signment of Jack Kirby’s copyrighted works.17  In response, Marvel 
filed suit for declaratory judgment in January 2010, arguing that the 
defendants had no termination rights under Section 304(c) of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 because the works of Jack Kirby were works 
made for hire.18  In March 2010, the Kirbys filed a motion to dismiss 
in the federal district court in New York.19  The Kirbys claimed that 
Lisa and Neal Kirby, residents of California, were not subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the federal court in New York.20  Based on Lisa 
and Neal’s personal jurisdiction argument, the Kirbys then argued 
that Lisa and Neal were indispensable parties under Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 19,21 and therefore, the suit should be dismissed 
because it could not proceed without them.22  The district court de-
nied the Kirbys’ motion and stated that it did have “personal jurisdic-
tion over Lisa and Neal under New York’s Long Arm Statute.”23  
Therefore, the district court did not need to reach the issue of whether 
 
14 Id. at 124.  Under the Copyright Act of 1976, the heirs of the person who holds the cop-
yright can exercise termination rights.  17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1), (2). 
15 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 126 (noting how Jack Kirby had a freer hand than the other artists 
and Kirby did not have page by page instructions as did other Marvel artists). 
16 Id. (noting the majority of Kirby’s works were published by Marvel and the works were 
mainly intended to fit within specific Marvel themes). 
17 Id. at 127. 
18 Id.  See infra notes 59, 61 (explaining why the heirs of Jack Kirby have standing to ex-
ercise termination rights, and also why the current Act is relevant for the issue of termination 
rights). 
19 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 127. 
20 Id. at 124, 127 (noting Lisa and Neal Kirby are two of the four heirs of Jack Kirby argu-
ing for termination rights). 
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
22 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 127. 
23 Id. 
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Lisa and Neal were indispensable parties.24  After discovery was 
completed, both parties moved for summary judgment.25  The court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and stated that Jack 
Kirby’s works were works made for hire and the Kirbys had no valid 
termination rights.26  The Kirbys appealed the district court’s deter-
mination.27 
The opinion in Marvel analyzed both the procedural disputes 
and the main issue concerning the parties’ rights under the Copyright 
Act of 1976.28  The central issue for the court was whether Jack Kir-
by’s works were “works made for hire” in order for Marvel to claim 
ownership rights to the works.29  Although the opinion in Marvel re-
solved which procedural rules applied to the parties, this note focuses 
on the development of the work for hire doctrine in the Second Cir-
cuit and the application of the instance and expense test under the 
doctrine.  Finally, this note critically analyzes the scope of the doc-
trine and its implications for those seeking to exercise termination 
rights.  While the court in Marvel was correct in determining Marvel 
had a right to control elements of Kirby’s works, it dismissed other 
factual issues which may have shown that they were not works for 
hire, and thus Kirby owned them. 
II. THE OPINION—THE PROCEDURAL ROAD TO THE CENTRAL 
ISSUE 
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Were the Kirbys Pulled in 
by the Long Arm of New York? 
A brief analysis of the procedural issues in Marvel provides a 




26 Id. at 127-28. 
27 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 128. 
28 Id. at 128, 131-32, 136. 
29 Id. at 124.  The Second Circuit applied the instance and expense test to determine 
whether Kirby’s works were works made for hire.  Id. at 140-41.  The Supreme Court, in 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1989), rejected the Second 
Circuit’s instance and expense test as an appropriate test to determine when a work arising 
under the 1976 Act is a work for hire.  However, the Second Circuit still applies the instance 
and expense test to determine whether a work arising under the 1909 Act is a work made for 
hire.  See infra section IV. 
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proper if a litigant is proven to be “present” in the forum state.30  
Presence in the forum state need not be physical presence, but rather 
based on the existence of certain minimum contacts of the litigant 
with the forum state.31  New York enacted its own long-arm personal 
jurisdiction statute which states: 
[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts 
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his ex-
ecutor or administrator, who in person or through an 
agent: . . . transacts any business within the state or 
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the 
state.32 
On appeal, the court in Marvel held that New York did not 
have personal jurisdiction over Lisa and Neal Kirby.33  Lisa and Neal, 
who were residents of California, were not present in New York be-
cause their communications with Marvel, i.e., the sending of the ter-
mination notices, did not constitute adequate business transactions 
within New York.34  The court stated that the Kirbys did not “pur-
posefully avail [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
[the] law.”35  Thus, the exercise of their purported rights under the 
federal copyright law did not constitute purposeful availment. 
To support the court’s narrow view of personal jurisdiction in 
Marvel, the court looked to Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies,36 
which held that the defendant’s cease and desist letter sent to the 
plaintiff did not constitute adequate business transactions.37  In Men-
zies, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment in New York district 
court, arguing its weight loss products did not infringe on the defend-
ant’s copyrights.38  Analyzing the weight of the letters in connection 
with personal jurisdiction, the court held that the defendant’s letter 
alleging infringement in an unspecified place and in an unspecified 
 
30 See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). 
31 Id. at 316. 
32 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2014). 
33 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 129-31. 
34 Id. at 130. 
35 Id. at 128 (citing Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
36 715 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983). 
37 Id. at 766. 
38 Id. at 759-60. 
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forum was not an “activity invoking the ‘benefits and protections’ of 
New York law.”39  The court refused to apply a broad interpretation 
of what constituted “transacting business” and stated, “New York 
courts have consistently refused to sustain section 302(a)(1) jurisdic-
tion solely on the basis of defendant’s communication from another 
locale with a party in New York.”40  Although the cease and desist 
letters were sent to Beacon’s New York offices, the letters alone were 
not enough to trigger New York’s long-arm statute.41 
Relying on earlier case law, the court in Marvel determined 
that the long-arm statute may not apply in situations when the isolat-
ed transaction does not afford the party at issue the protections and 
benefits of New York law.42  Lisa and Neal Kirby were not present in 
New York; thus, they could not be present in the case before the 
court. 
B. Joinder and Indispensable Parties: Another 
Procedural Tactic Used by the Kirbys 
Because the court held that Lisa and Neal Kirby were not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in New York, the court proceeded to de-
termine whether Lisa and Neal were indispensable parties, an issue 
the district court did not reach.43  According to Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. (1) Re-
quired Party. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party 
if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot ac-
cord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) 
that person claims an interest relating to the subject of 
 
39 Id. at 760, 766 (noting the cease and desist letter did not state where the alleged in-
fringement occurred, and it did not state where the plaintiff would take legal action). 
40 Id. at 766. 
41 Beacon Enters., 715 F.2d at 766; see also Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 
837 (N.Y. 2007) (holding personal jurisdiction not satisfied when the defendant’s only busi-
ness transactions were sending letters in according with English procedural rules).  But see 
Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (N.Y. 2006) 
(holding personal jurisdiction proper because the parties’ internet communications constitut-
ed continuous business transactions for substantial amounts of money). 
42 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 128-30. 
43 Id. at 132. 
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the action and is so situated that disposing of the ac-
tion in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect 
the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or oth-
erwise inconsistent obligations because of the inter-
est.44 
The court articulated each factor under the rule in order to de-
termine whether Lisa and Neal Kirby would be prejudiced if the liti-
gation proceeded in their absence.45  The court first determined Lisa 
and Neal Kirby were required parties to the claim under Rule 19(a) 
because they had a great interest in the outcome of the suit.46  How-
ever, Lisa and Neal were not indispensable under Rule 19(b) because 
they would not be prejudiced if a judgment was rendered in their ab-
sence.47  The court stated that Lisa and Neal Kirby had the same in-
terests as the remaining Kirbys in the case, so they did not need “their 
day in court” because the other appellants would litigate on their be-
half.48  Because of the Kirbys’ identical interests, any judgment ren-
dered against the remaining Kirbys would foreclose Lisa and Neal’s 
rights as well.49 
To determine when a party is considered indispensable, the 
court looked to Prescription Plan Service Corp. v. Franco,50 in which 
a New York corporation sued several trustees of the company for di-
verting funds from a benefit program.51  In this case, the lower court 
dismissed two defendants from the claim for being non-diverse and 
stated that those two defendants were indispensable parties.52  How-
ever, on appeal, the court held that the two defendants were not in-
dispensable parties because their interests were identical to the inter-
ests of the remaining defendants.53  The court reasoned that neither 
the absent nor the remaining defendants would be prejudiced because 
 
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
45 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 133-35. 
46 Id. at 132. 
47 Id. at 133. 
48 Id. at 134 (stating a judgment rendered against the remaining Kirbys would foreclose 
Lisa and Neal’s rights because all the Kirbys’ interests in the case were identical). 
49 Id. 
50 552 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1977). 
51 Id. at 494-95. 
52 Id. at 496. 
53 Id. at 497. 
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any judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would be paid by the corpora-
tion that the defendants represented, so none of the defendants would 
be personally liable.54  Also, the court stated the interests of the par-
ties were still represented by the same counsel, with the same vigor.55  
Although the absent defendants had a viable stake in the outcome, the 
remaining defendants suffered no prejudice because their interests 
were sufficiently represented by the presence of the remaining de-
fendants.  Therefore, even though Lisa and Neal Kirby were not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in New York, the case was able to pro-
ceed because Lisa and Neal were not indispensable parties, and their 
interests would be represented by the remaining parties to the suit.56 
III. THE OPINION—THE ORIGINS OF THE WORK FOR HIRE 
DOCTRINE 
A. Why Termination Rights Rest on the Work for 
Hire Doctrine 
After the court resolved the procedural issues, it turned to the 
parties’ copyright arguments.  Determining whether a work is made 
for hire is critical for the artist, especially if he believes his work is 
copyrightable.  If it is determined that the work was made for hire, 
the employer is the owner of the work.  Therefore, the artist is not en-
titled to the profits generated from the work and cannot assign the 
copyright to others.  However, if the artist’s work is copyrightable 
and it is not a work for hire, the artist owns the copyright, which he 
can assign to others, and he also has the right to terminate any as-
signment after the statutory period.57  Importantly, termination rights 
provide artists with another chance at marketing their work at a later 
time.58  For example, artists may expand their work by incorporating 
it into lucrative derivative works, which may not have been available 
when they first obtained the copyright.  Therefore, the issue of 
whether the Kirbys had present termination rights under the Copy-
right Act of 1976 (the “Act”) rested on whether Jack Kirby’s works 
 
54 Id. 
55 Prescription Plan, 552 F.2d at 497. 
56 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 134. 
57 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1)(A). 
58 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.01[A] (2013). 
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were, in fact, works made for hire.59  Section 304(c) of the Act pro-
vides the prerequisites needed in order to have termination rights: 
Termination of Transfers and Licenses Covering Ex-
tended Renewal Term.—In the case of any copyright 
subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January 
1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made for 
hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer 
or license of the renewal copyright or any right under 
it, executed before January 1, 1978 . . . is subject to 
termination.60 
Because the termination rights associated with a copyrighted 
work belonging to an employer cannot be exercised by the original 
artist when a work is considered one made for hire, Marvel argued 
that Kirby’s works were made for hire during the relevant time period 
based on evidence of his close working relationship with Marvel.61  
Therefore, if Marvel prevailed under this argument, the Kirbys would 
not have termination rights under the Act. 
In order for the court to reconcile whether Jack Kirby’s works 
were works made for hire, the court had to first interpret the term, as 
used in case law under the Copyright Act of 1909, which was— “the 
law in effect when the works were created.”62  A work for hire 
agreement can be impliedly found by looking at the relationship be-
tween the hired party and the artist.63  The 1909 Act did not provide a 
definition of a work made for hire, but it did state, “the word ‘author’ 
 
59 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 124. 
60 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (emphasis added).  If an author is no longer alive, § 304(c)(2) grants 
his or her termination rights to specified heirs.  See § 304(c)(3) for when a copyright owner 
is allowed to send notice of termination. 
61 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 127. 
62 Id. at 137.  Marvel argued that the works were works made for hire under 304(c) of the 
1976 Act because the issue of termination rights falls under the current Act.  Id. at 136.  The 
actual meaning of a work made for hire developed first under the 1909 Act.  Id. at 137.  
While the work for hire doctrine has expanded under the current Act, “[it] did not cause any 
immediate break in the courts’ reasoning; thus, it is necessary to consult cases decided under 
the current Act to round out one’s understanding of the work for hire doctrine under the 1909 
Act as well.”  1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.03[B][1][a][i]. 
63 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 139.  See also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Mar-
tha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 634-35 (2d Cir. 2004) (provid-
ing the test used for finding an implied work for hire agreement).  “In determining whether a 
work is a work for hire under the 1909 Act, we have generally applied the ‘instance and ex-
pense’ test.  The copyright belongs to the person at whose ‘instance and expense’ the work 
was created.”  Id. 
9
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shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”64  This 
meant that if the work was made for hire, the author of the work was 
the employer, rather than the artist.65  However, terms such as “works 
made for hire” and “employer” were not specifically defined under 
the Act.66  Therefore, it was up to the courts to develop these terms 
and shape the meaning of the work for hire doctrine.67 
B. Early Development of the Doctrine 
Because the work for hire doctrine focused on whether the 
owner of a copyright was the artist or the artist’s employer, the courts 
analyzed common law employment relationships.68  Looking to the 
Second Circuit’s development of the work for hire doctrine, the 
courts focused on “whether the work at issue was created within the 
scope of a traditional employment relationship”69 in order to deter-
mine which party was the statutory “author.”70 
Under the law of agency, the employer would be the owner of 
his employee’s work in a traditional employer-employee relation-
ship.71  However, the courts realized that although the parties were 
not engaged in a traditional employer-employee relationship, the 
hired party could be controlled to such an extent by the hiring party 
that he is considered an employee.72  The courts then needed to de-
termine when the hired party was acting as an employee within the 
scope of employment for work for hire purposes.73  Initially, the Se-
cond Circuit resolved this issue by stating, “[i]f a [party] ‘is solicited 
by a patron to execute a commission for pay, the presumption should 
be indulged that the patron desires to control the publication . . . un-
less by the terms of the contract, express or implicit, the artist has re-
served the copyright [in] himself.’ ”74  The right to control the pro-
 
64 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 137. 
65 Id. 
66 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.03[B][1][a][i]. 
67 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 137. 
68 Id. at 137-38. 
69 Id. at 137. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 137-38. 
72 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 139. 
73 Id. at 137. 
74 Id. at 138 (quoting Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(emphasis added)). 
10
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duction of the work was a determining factor as to whether the crea-
tor of the work was a mere independent contractor or an employee. 
C. Development Under the 1976 Act—The Reid 
Decision 
After the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Act 
provided a definition of what constituted a work made for hire, and it 
seemed to incorporate the judicial decisions under the previous Act: 
A ‘work made for hire’ is—(1) a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment; 
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for 
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of 
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a trans-
lation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as 
an instructional text . . . if the parties expressly agree 
in a written instrument signed by them that the work 
shall be considered a work made for hire.75 
However, similar to the issue with the 1909 Act, it was still left to the 
courts to define the terms “scope of employment” and “employ-
er/employee” as they applied to the 1976 Act. 
The Supreme Court decision in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid76 followed the enactment of the present Act and re-
solved a split in the circuits on the appropriate test to use for work for 
hire issues.77  The Court officially adopted the common law of agen-
cy to determine whether the hired party was an employee acting with-
in the scope of employment for work for hire purposes.78  In this case, 
the plaintiff, a nonprofit organization benefitting the homeless, 
brought an action to establish a copyright in a sculpture that the de-
fendant created for the organization.79  The parties initially entered 
 
75 17 U.S.C § 101 (2006). 
76 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
77 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.03[B][1][a]-[a][iii] (noting the circuit split regard-
ing what standard to apply in work for hire cases). 
78 Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (2006): 
An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing 
work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct sub-
ject to the employer's control.  An employee's act is not within the scope 
of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct 
not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer. 
79 Reid, 490 U.S. at 733, 735. 
11
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into a contract for the defendant to build a sculpture to “dramatize the 
plight of the homeless” that would be on display at the plaintiff’s 
Christmas pageant.80  The plaintiff’s members often visited the de-
fendant to check on the progress of the work, and the defendant 
sculptor took most of their suggestions regarding the appearance and 
structure of the piece.81  The defendant was paid his final installment 
check upon completion of the work.82 
The controversy reached the Supreme Court, which held that 
the sculpture was not a work made for hire under Section 101(1), and 
therefore, the defendant owned the sculpture.83  The Court relied 
heavily on the traditional common law principles of agency to deter-
mine whether the defendant was acting within the scope of employ-
ment when he built the sculpture.84  Under the law of agency, an em-
ployee is an agent whose employer controls “the manner and means” 
of the employee’s performance or work.85  However, an independent 
contractor is someone who contracts with another to do work, but is 
not controlled by that person.86  Based on this theory, the Court held 
that the defendant was not an employee, but rather an independent 
contractor because he set his own hours, supplied his own tools, and 
was not paid employee benefits by the plaintiff which also did not 
manifest an intent to assign future work to the defendant.87  Because 
 
80 Id. at 733. 
81 Id. at 734. 
82 Id. at 735. 
83 Id. at 736. 
84 Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40.  See NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.01[B][1][a][iii] (“[T]he 
court unanimously ruled that Congress’ use of the terms ‘employee’ and ‘scope of employ-
ment’ evinced its intent to invoke traditional agency law principles.”). 
85 Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52 (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 7.07(3)(a) (stating that “an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right 
to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work.”).  See generally Par-
ker v. Domino’s Pizza, 629 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
86 Parker, 629 So. 2d at 1027. 
87 Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53.  In determining the scope of employment, the Court in Reid 
also determined other relevant factors such as: 
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the lo-
cation of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the 
hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how 
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and 
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the 
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of em-
ployee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Id. at 751-52. 
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the plaintiff had no right to control the defendant’s work, it was not a 
work made for hire. 
The decision in Reid was crucial to the development of the 
work for hire doctrine.  The Court heavily applied agency law prece-
dent to scrutinize the parties’ relationships and determine whether a 
work was made for hire.88  In addition, this decision redefined “the 
““right to control.”89  Early cases examined whether the employer 
had the right to control production, but the Court in Reid rejected that 
approach because it was “inconsistent with the language, structure, 
and legislative history of the work for hire provisions.”90  The Court 
specified that under the principles of agency law, the analysis must be 
whether the hiring party had the “right to control the manner and 
means by which the product is accomplished.”91  “The “manner and 
means” approach expanded the work for hire doctrine by including 
elements of agency.92  Although the Court in Reid established a new 
standard for works arising under the 1976 Act, the court in Marvel 
continued with its own standard when it applied the instance and ex-
pense test to works arising under the 1909 Act.93 
The Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976, as 
well as case law under both Acts, looked to traditional employment 
relationships to determine whether a person’s works fell under the 
works for hire doctrine.  As the approach to determining ownership 
of works became clearer, tests such as the instance and expense test 
would further clarify the work for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act. 
IV. INSTANCE AND EXPENSE TEST & ITS APPLICATION IN 
MARVEL 
A. Origins of Instance and Expense Test 
After the Supreme Court’s discussion in Reid, the law of 
agency was the new standard, and courts examined “the hiring par-
ty’s right to control the “manner and means” of the artist’s work to 
 
88 Id. at 736.  Section 101(2) was not applicable in Reid because the sculpture was not 
considered a contribution to a collective work and there was no written agreement between 
the two parties.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2). 
89 Reid, 490 U.S. at 736-37, 751. 
90 Id. at 750-51. 
91 Id. at 751 (emphasis added) 
92 Id. 
93 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41. 
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determine the scope of employment.94  However, the court in Marvel 
applied the instance and expense test to determine the owner of Jack 
Kirby’s works.95  The test allows the work of an independent contrac-
tor to be a work made for hire based on the parties’ agreement or 
right to control.96  Although the standard in Reid is applied to works 
governed under the current Act, the Second Circuit applies “the ‘in-
stance and expense’ test” to works arising under the 1909 Act.97 
The court in Marvel interpreted the terms “instance” and “ex-
pense” based on case law which established the test.  The court stated 
that the term “ ‘instance’ refers to the extent to which the hiring party 
provided the impetus for, participated in, or had the power to super-
vise the creation of the work.”98  The term expense “refers to the re-
sources the hiring party invests in the creation of the work.”99  While 
the components of the test portray a general idea of what this ap-
proach entails, the courts have more thoroughly defined the test to 
show which relationships comprise a work for hire situation. 
The Second Circuit first discussed the test in Brattleboro Pub-
lishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,100 in which the court deter-
mined whether the plaintiff, the publisher of a daily newspaper, 
owned the advertisements placed in his newspaper.101  The defendant, 
a publisher of a weekly news pamphlet, had the same advertisements 
as those in the plaintiff’s paper.102  The plaintiff argued that he owned 
the rights to the advertisements.103  The court looked the plaintiff 
newspaper’s staff’s control over the works and stated, “[the work for 
hire doctrine] is applicable whenever an employee’s work is pro-
duced at the instance and expense of his employer.”104  However, the 
court did not articulate the factors of the test.105  It was up to later 
courts to further develop the test, and its parameters were delineated 
 
94 Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. 
95 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41. 
96 Id. at 139. 
97 Playboy Enter, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir. 1995); Martha Graham, 380 
F.3d at 634-35. 
98 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 139. 
99 Id. 
100 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966). 
101 Id. at 567. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (emphasis added). 
105 Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 567-68. 
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in subsequent cases decided by the Second Circuit. 
The decision in Martha Graham School & Dance Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc.106 
demonstrated how the instance and expense test could be used to find 
an implied work for hire agreement concerning works created under 
the 1909 Act.107  In this case, the court resolved the issue of whether 
numerous choreographed dances created by the famed dance instruc-
tor, Martha Graham, were works made for hire.108  Graham also cre-
ated the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, which was 
the defendant in this case.109  Although she founded the school in the 
1920s, Graham did not become a full-time employee until 1966.110  
The dispute began when the beneficiary under Graham’s will claimed 
that he owned the rights to the choreographed work.111  When Gra-
ham died, the beneficiary became the defendant school’s artistic di-
rector and placed in a trust the copyrighted dances and other intellec-
tual property that passed to him under the will.112  After numerous 
disputes between the beneficiary and the school, the beneficiary acted 
through the trust and created the plaintiff non-profit organization.113  
The plaintiff then became the sole licensee of Graham’s live dance 
performances and trademark.114  When the defendant school reo-
pened, the beneficiary sought to enjoin the defendant school from us-
ing the dances, but the defendant argued that it owned the works un-
der the work for hire doctrine.115 
Because the dances in question were created under the 1909 
Act, the court analyzed the circumstances to find evidence of an im-
plied work for hire agreement.116  The court stated that under the 
work for hire doctrine, “[a] work is made at the hiring party’s ‘in-
stance and expense’ when the employer induces the creation of the 
 
106 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004). 
107 Id. at 634-35. 
108 Id. at 628. 
109 Id. at 629-30. 
110 Id. at 628, 639. 
111 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 630-31. 
112 Id. at 629-30.  Originally, the trust assigned many of dances and other property to the 
defendant school.  Id. at 630.  A dispute arose over the beneficiary’s role in the defendant 
school and the board of trustees voted him out.  Id.  Soon after, the school temporarily closed 
due to financial difficulties.  Id. 
113 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 630. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 630-31. 
116 Id. at 634-35, 637, 639. 
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work and has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which 
the work is carried out.”117  The court analyzed each of Graham’s 
dances to determine which dances were choreographed within the 
scope of her employment with the school.118  The court held that any 
dances choreographed before 1956 were not works made for hire be-
cause Graham was not employed by the school; thus, the school had 
no right to supervise or participate in her work.119  The court also held 
that the dances choreographed during the years 1956-1965 were not 
works made for hire because Graham was only a “part-time employ-
ee” during those years.120  There was “no evidence that the school . . . 
commissioned [Graham] to create the dances;” thus, the dances were 
not created at the school’s instance.121  Also, Graham’s employment 
contract during the relevant time stated that she was only “to teach 
and supervise the School’s educational program, and not to choreo-
graph;” therefore, choreographing her own dances was not within the 
scope of her employment.122  Looking at the law of agency and Gra-
ham’s employment relationship with the school under the instance 
and expense test, the court concluded that the specific works created 
were her own and were not created on behalf of the school.123  How-
ever, the court in Martha Graham then went on to hold that the works 
created during the years 1966-1977 were works made for hire and be-
longed to the school.124  During this period, Graham entered into a 
new employment contract in which she went from “part-time dance 
instructor to full-time choreographer.”125  Because Graham was act-
ing as a traditional employee when choreographing the dances, the 
court held that those dances were works made for hire.126  Further-
more, in terms of the expense component, Graham was a salaried 
employee at that time, so she choreographed the dances at the 
 
117 Id. at 635. 
118 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 637, 639. 
119 Id. at 637. 
120 Id. at 637-38. 
121 Id. at 638. 
122 Id. 
123 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 637-38. 
124 Id. at 639.  The court also held that the dances created by Graham from 1978 through 
1991 were works made for hire.  Id. at 641.  Those dances are governed under the present 
Copyright Act of 1976.  Id. 
125 Id. at 639 (emphasis added) (stressing the importance of Martha Graham’s scope of 
employment during the relevant time). 
126 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 139-40. 
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school’s expense.127  The court explained that the expense require-
ment was satisfied because the school took a risk by having the danc-
es created on its time and resources, and in return, it compensated 
Graham for her work.128  An analysis of Graham’s role as an employ-
ee of the school at different time periods evidenced an implied work 
for hire agreement.  Graham only acted at the school’s instance and 
expense when she was a full-time employee acting within the scope 
of her employment, and thus, those works were the only ones subject 
to the work for hire doctrine. 
Examining the hiring party’s creative contributions to the art-
ist’s work and the artist’s payment upon completion of the work may 
help determine whether the work was created at the hiring party’s in-
stance and expense.  This notion was discussed in Playboy Enterpris-
es, Inc. v. Dumas,129 in which the plaintiff magazine publisher argued 
that it owned works of the defendant’s husband as works made for 
hire.130  The facts of Playboy, which involved the works of a free-
lance artist who created his works with the magazine publisher’s 
themes in mind, are similar to the facts in Marvel.131  In this case, the 
artist created hundreds of works which were published by the plain-
tiff.132  The defendant was the artist’s wife who inherited the artist’s 
works after his death, and the dispute arose after the defendant grant-
ed reproduction rights to the artist’s paintings to a third party.133  Be-
cause the assigned works were featured in several of the plaintiff’s 
publications, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment stating it 
owned the works under the work for hire doctrine.134  The district 
court held that the works by the artists were created at the plaintiff’s 
instance but not expense, so the plaintiff appealed.135 
The case reached the Second Circuit, which analyzed the rela-




129 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995). 
130 Id. at 551. 
131 Id. at 555.  See Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141 (noting the majority of Jack Kirby’s work was 
based on Marvel themes). 
132 Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 552.  The works created by the artist on or after January 1, 
1978 were governed by the current Act.  Id. at 557. 
133 Id. at 553. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 553, 555. 
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type of working relationship that was established.136  Under the in-
stance component, the plaintiff claimed that it owned the works be-
cause it gave the artist specific instructions on how the paintings had 
to coincide with the magazine’s articles.137  Over the years, the art-
ist’s paintings were used more frequently, and he was given freer 
range to produce paintings without specific instructions from the 
plaintiff.138  However, the court agreed with the lower court’s reason-
ing and found evidence of the plaintiff’s instructions to be control-
ling.139  Even though the plaintiff’s direct control over the artist’s 
works decreased over the years, the prior dealings between the two 
parties were enough to prove that the plaintiff had the right to super-
vise and control the work.140  The instance component was further 
satisfied because a majority of the artist’s works were motivated or 
induced by the plaintiff.141  Because the artist had the expectation of 
the plaintiff’s publishing his works, it proved that the plaintiff in-
duced the creation of the artist’s works. 
The court’s focus on the hiring party’s payment to the artist 
indicated that the work was made at the plaintiff’s expense.142  The 
lower court stated that the expense component was not satisfied be-
cause the artist created the works using his own tools and office.143  
Furthermore, the plaintiff did not pay employee benefits or taxes on 
behalf of the artist.144  Based on these factors, the lower court stated 
that the plaintiff assumed no real risk by having the works created.145  
However, the Second Circuit resolved the issue when it found that 
evidence of the artist’s being paid a “sum certain” for his works was 
enough to satisfy the expense component.146  The court stated that the 
lower court incorrectly considered the expense factors that the Su-
preme Court considered in Reid because that standard is inapplicable 
 
136 Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 553. 
137 Id. at 556. 
138 Id. at 552. 
139 Id. at 556. 
140 Id. 
141 Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 556. 




146 Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 555 (interpreting the holding in Brattleboro, 369 F.2d 
565). 
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to works created under the 1909 Act.147  It stated that factors such as 
whether the artist supplied his own tools and materials, were irrele-
vant because those factors were used to determine whether the artist 
was an independent contractor or employee, not specifically whether 
the work was made at the hiring party’s expense.148  Therefore, the 
court broadly held that because the plaintiff took a financial risk, i.e., 
payment for the artist’s work, the expense component was fulfilled.149  
The court stated that it was relying on previous Second Circuit case 
law for this determination, so it did not find other factors, such as the 
use of the artist’s own resources, relevant to the analysis.150 
The instance and expense test was used by the Second Circuit 
to determine whether the hiring party influenced an independent con-
tractor to such an extent that the independent contractor was actually 
considered an employee under the employer’s control.  Creating a 
work at the direction or encouragement of the hiring party may prove 
the artist’s works were made at the party’s instance.  Evidence of the 
hiring party’s expending resources or even giving payment to the art-
ist may show the hiring party took the risk of having the works creat-
ed, and thus, the works were created at the party’s expense.  The 
court in Marvel applied this case law in its own analysis under the in-
stance and expense test. 
B. Application in Marvel 
The court in Marvel used the instance and expense test to deter-
mine that Jack Kirby was acting under the control of Marvel when he 
created the works.151  Under the instance factor, the court analyzed the 
continuous working relationship between Kirby and Marvel.152  Even 
though Kirby was a “freelancer,” Marvel’s director stated that Kirby was 
 
147 Id. at 555. 
148 Id. (“The factors considered by the district court . . . are among the factors listed by the 
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid which may be used to 
show that an artist worked as an independent contractor and not as a formal employee.  The 
factors have no bearing on whether the work was made at the hiring party's expense.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
149 Id. 
150 Id.  The Second Circuit remanded the case to determine whether the artist’s work after 
1977 were works made for hire because “Playboy stopped giving Nagel specific assignments 
before January 1, 1978.”  Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 556, 556 n.2. 
151 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41. 
152 Id. at 141. 
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kept busy with assignments and Kirby’s work was in high demand.153  
During the relevant time period, Marvel produced most of Kirby’s 
works, and Kirby was influenced by Marvel themes when he created the 
work, so it was “hardly self-directed.”154  Marvel also played a creative 
role in the creation of Kirby’s works because although he had more 
creative control than other Marvel artists, “he worked within the scope 
of Marvel’s assignments and titles.”155  Marvel retained the power to re-
ject Kirby’s works or ask for revisions.156  Therefore, evidence produced 
by Marvel showed Kirby’s inclination to create works on behalf of Mar-
vel, but Marvel retained the final say in the publication of his works.157 
The Kirbys claimed that the works were not made at the in-
stance of Marvel because the “right to supervise” must stem from a 
contractual right.158  The Kirbys attempted to narrowly define the 
work for hire doctrine when they argued a right to supervise and con-
trol the work came from a “contractual right.”159  The Kirbys based 
this claim on the analysis in Martha Graham, which discussed the 
hiring party’s right to control, even if the right was never exer-
cised.160  The court rejected this claim because the decision in Martha 
Graham did not require a specific contractual agreement of the hiring 
party’s right to control.161  Therefore, the Kirbys’ argument construed 
the “right” too narrowly, and they were not able to support their posi-
tion.162  If the Kirbys also analyzed the decision in Reid more closely, 
they would have noted that the Court settled this issue in its discus-
sion.163  While the Court in Reid adamantly noted the importance of 
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of the artist’s 
work, the Court made no reference to contractual agreements being 





156 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 141-42. 
159 Id. (emphasis added). 
160 Brief for Appellant at 42-43, Marvel v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-
3333) (emphasis added).  See also Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 635 (“The right to direct and 
supervise the manner in which work is created need never be exercised.”). 
161 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 634-35 (noting the use of the instance and expense test to 
determine an implied work for hire agreement under the 1909 Act). 
162 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141-42. 
163 Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. 
164 Id. 
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The Kirbys also attempted to survive summary judgment by 
pointing to factual disputes regarding which party actually created the 
plots, characters, and concepts of the works.165  However, the court 
stated it was not necessary to resolve which party put forth its creativ-
ity in this case.166  It was obvious that Kirby was hired for his insight 
and creativity, but the Kirbys argued that did not evidence a work 
made for hire because Kirby used his intelligence and resourcefulness 
when he created all his works.167  The Kirbys’ arguments were shown 
to be outside the focus of the work for hire analysis and, therefore, 
not relevant to the court’s determination. 
The court in Marvel was correct in concluding that Jack Kir-
by’s works were made at the instance of Marvel.  Kirby acted under 
the direction of Marvel when he sought to create specific works relat-
ing to Marvel characters and concepts.  Although Kirby’s work was 
produced by other publishers, the existence of the steady relationship 
between Kirby and Marvel showed Kirby’s dedication and creativity 
remained focused on Marvel. 
The Kirbys then argued that the works were not created at 
Marvel’s expense because Kirby was the one who bore the risk of 
loss—he did not receive steady payment for his works and he provid-
ed his own supplies and office space.168  The Kirbys also argued that 
Jack Kirby took a risk by creating the works because Kirby was un-
certain whether Marvel would purchase them.169 
Although a more difficult determination for the court, it con-
cluded that Jack Kirby’s works were made at Marvel’s expense.170  
Marvel asked the court to analyze the holding in Playboy to conclude 
that the evidence of Kirby’s payment was enough to fulfill the ex-
pense requirement.171  The court noted that if the relationship be-
tween Marvel and Kirby was sporadic or consisted of discreet en-
gagements, it would be prompted to rely on the extraneous factors 
presented by the Kirbys.172  However, the court agreed with Marvel 
 
165 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 142. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (“It makes little sense to foreclose a finding that work is made for hire because the 




170 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 143. 
171 Id. at 142; Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 555. 
172 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 142. 
21
Dolzani: Work for Hire Doctrine
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
914 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
and rejected the Kirbys’ argument because the evidence showed that 
the relationship between Marvel and Kirby was continuous and mu-
tually beneficial.173  Kirby was expected to produce works within 
specific Marvel themes, and in return, Marvel would buy Kirby’s 
work.174  Even though Kirby’s payment was technically on a contin-
gent basis, Marvel was rarely prompted to refuse Kirby’s work.175  
Therefore, Kirby had a grounded expectation that his work would be 
bought by Marvel, and this suggested the existence of a formal em-
ployment relationship.176 
In its analysis of the expense component, the court concluded 
that Kirby’s works were not easily marketable to other publishers be-
cause the majority of Kirby’s works were for Marvel projects.177  The 
works were built on preexisting themes Marvel had created, and thus, 
it is determined that Marvel supplied Kirby with some of the re-
sources to do the work.178  Finally, although the court in Marvel con-
sidered more factors in the expense analysis than the court in Playboy 
did, the court in Marvel relied on Playboy when it stated that “Mar-
vel’s payment of a flat rate and its contribution of both creative and 
production value . . . [were] enough to satisfy the expense require-
ment.”179  Because Marvel paid Kirby a sum certain for his work and 
developed the resources Kirby cultivated, the work was made at 
Marvel’s expense. 
Although there was persuasive evidence that Jack Kirby’s 
works were made at Marvel’s instance, the fulfilment of the expense 
component is a weaker argument.  The court should have relied more 
upon the Kirbys’ argument, which presented issues of fact.  The ar-
guments in the appellant’s brief contained many factual issues that 
the court in Marvel prematurely dismissed.180  For example, it is 
plausible to conclude that disputes over the parties’ intent, at the time 
the works were created, as to who owned the works should have sur-
 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 142-43. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 143. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (emphasis added) (stressing the evaluation of the hired party’s payment to the artist, 
along with other factors of the parties’ relationship); see also Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 
555. 
180 See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 47, 51. 
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vived summary judgment.181  The Kirbys stated that Jack Kirby’s 
checks from Marvel during the relevant time period contained a “leg-
end” acknowledging Kirby’s assignment of his copyrights to Mar-
vel.182  If Marvel stated that Kirby had assignment rights, it meant 
Kirby owned the work to be assigned, not Marvel.183 
The court then wrongfully determined that Kirby’s work was 
not marketable to other publishers even though the Kirbys offered ev-
idence to the contrary.184  During the relevant time period, Jack Kirby 
developed a plot line for Thor based on Marvel themes, but Marvel 
rejected it.185  Even though the work may have been created at Mar-
vel’s instance, it was not created at Marvel’s expense because Jack 
Kirby ended up selling Thor to Marvel’s rival, DC Comics, and Mar-
vel did not object.186  Although the court mentioned that Marvel had 
supplied Kirby with preexisting themes, the other factual disputes of-
fered by the Kirbys should have been considered by the court before 
it broadly concluded Jack Kirby’s works were made at Marvel’s ex-
pense.  Relying only on Marvel’s payment of Kirby, as the court in 
Playboy did, the court dismissed critical factual issues which should 
have survived summary judgment. 
Although the Kirbys offered viable evidence to the contrary, 
the court in Marvel held that Jack Kirby’s works were made at “Mar-
vel’s instance and expense,” and thus, Jack Kirby’s works were 
works made for hire during the relevant time period.187  Because Kir-
by created the works with Marvel themes in mind and Marvel paid 
Kirby for the works, it suggested the creation of Kirby’s works was 
under Marvel’s control.  Therefore, Marvel owned the rights to Jack 
Kirby’s works, and the Kirbys did not have termination rights under 
the Copyright Act of 1976. 
 
 
181 Id. at 47-48. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 51. 
185 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 51. 
186 Id. 
187 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 143.  After the instance and expense test is satisfied, a presump-
tion “arises that the works were ‘works made for hire’.”  Id.  “This presumption can be over-
come only by evidence of an agreement to the contrary . . . .”  Id.  In this case, the court stat-
ed the Kirbys failed to establish evidence which would support an agreement to the contrary.  
Id. 
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V. WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE AND ITS MODERN 
IMPLICATIONS 
The development of the work for hire doctrine has significant-
ly evolved since its initial creation under the Copyright Act of 1909.  
Illustrative works created decades ago are constantly being reborn 
though motion picture adaptations, video games, and toys, and the 
application of the work for hire doctrine is critical in determining 
ownership of these potentially lucrative works.  As seen in Marvel, 
the modern application of the work for hire doctrine affects all artists 
whose work may be turned into a derivative production. 
A. Marvel Attempts to Prove Work for Hire for Ghost 
Rider 
The Second Circuit decided Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC 
v. Marvel Characters, Inc.,188 shortly before the decision in Marvel 
was rendered.189  The plaintiff, a freelancer for Marvel, appealed 
from summary judgment dismissal and argued, inter alia, that he 
owned the rights to the character “Ghost Rider.”190  In 1971, the 
plaintiff approached a former Marvel publisher with an idea for a 
storyline of a motorcycle-riding villain named “Ghost Rider.”191  A 
meeting was then set up with the director of Marvel, Stan Lee, who 
approved the book idea, but also interjected his own ideas for the 
character.192 
After the meeting, the plaintiff began writing story lines for 
the character.193  However, “[t]he rest of the book was produced ac-
cording to the ‘Marvel Method,’ ” which was a template Marvel 
requried all its artists follow.194  Marvel also retained editorial control 
 
188 716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013). 
189 Id. at 308.  The plaintiff in this case appealed the district court’s ruling of summary 
judgment for Marvel.  Id. at 307-08. 
190 Id. at 307. 
191 Id. at 321. 
192 Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321. 
193 Id. 
194 Id.  The “Marvel Method” was a way in which to keep Marvel artists busy in order to 
produce more comic book plots efficiently and in a timely manner.  See Marvel Comics, 
CRACKED.COM, http://www.cracked.com/funny-55-marvel-comics/ (last visited May 2, 2014) 
(“[T]he Marvel Method meant that the writer came up with a basic plot, the penciler drew 
whatever he wanted as long as it corresponded to that plot, and the writer went back over the 
penciled pages and filled in captions and dialogue.”). 
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and paid the plaintiff at a per page rate.195 
The court discussed the work for hire agreement that the 
plaintiff signed after the 1976 Act came into effect.196  The document 
stated that any works which “have been or are in the future created” 
belong to Marvel as a work made for hire.197  While it seemed as 
though it was an effective work for hire agreement covering the 
plaintiff’s past and future works, the Second Circuit held that the 
agreement was sufficiently vague to constitute a factual dispute.198  
Furthermore, the parties’ intentions embodied in the agreement were 
irrelevant because many of the works at issue were created pursuant 
to the 1909 Act as opposed to the 1976 Act.199  Therefore, on remand, 
Marvel could only offer evidence of the parties’ intention to show an 
implied work for hire agreement.200 
Although the case was remanded based on factual issues, the 
court stated that a jury would most likely find the plaintiff’s work to 
be one made for hire.201  The court noted that the plaintiff had “noth-
ing more than an uncopyrightable idea for a motorcycle-riding char-
acter when he presented it to Marvel because he had not yet fixed the 
idea into a tangible medium.”202  The court stated that Marvel “in-
duced the creation of” the character and “had the right” to supervise 
the plaintiff’s work.203  The director of Marvel also commissioned the 
costs; thus, the work was made at Marvel’s expense.204  Therefore, 
even if the work for hire agreement between the two parties was held 
to be unenforceable, the evidence of the relationship between the 
plaintiff and Marvel could prove the work for “Ghost Rider” was 
made for hire.205 
The issues presented in Gary Friedrich were similar to the is-
sues presented in Marvel because it was argued that both artists orig-
inated the work.  There were more factual issues in Marvel concern-
 
195 Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321. 
196 Id. at 309.  If a work does not fall within the scope of employment under 17 U.S.C. § 
101(1), then an express work for hire agreement is needed for a work to fall under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101(2).  17 U.S.C. § 101(2). 
197 Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 310. 
198 Id. at 314-15. 
199 Id. at 316. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 321. 
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ing the instance and expense components, but unlike the outcome of 
Gary Friedrich, the controversy in Marvel was not remanded for a 
determination of the factual issues.206  Unlike the artist in Gary Frie-
drich, Kirby was not subjected to the “Marvel Method” according to 
creative director, Stan Lee.207  This shows Kirby had more creative 
control than other artists; thus, the argument of Marvel’s control over 
Kirby may not have been as strong as it was for the artist in Gary 
Friedrich.  However, in both cases, Marvel maintained some editorial 
control of the work with the right to reject and edit the work.208 
Overall, in comparing the relationships between Marvel and 
the artists, the work by the artist in Gary Friedrich was clearly at the 
instance and expense of Marvel.  Because the “Ghost Rider” charac-
ter was a Marvel character prior to the artist’s plotline for the series, 
the work was created at Marvel’s instance.209  The court in Gary 
Friedrich also found that Marvel paid all costs throughout the pro-
duction of the book, which weighed strongly in favor of the expense 
component.210  Therefore, the Second Circuit applies the instance and 
expense component on a case by case basis. 
B. Does the Instance and Expense Test Favor the 
Hiring Party? 
The Second Circuit’s use of the instance and expense test for 
works created under the Copyright Act of 1909 displays a thorough 
approach in determining an implied work for hire agreement; howev-
er, if too broadly applied, the test may tend to favor the hiring party 
as the owner of the works.  Although this test has not been applied to 
works under the 1976 Act, this argument is applicable when deter-
mining scope of employment under the current Act based on the Reid 
analysis. 
The argument of overbreadth was a focal point for the Kirbys 
in their appeal to the Second Circuit, although it did not gain recogni-
tion by the court.211  The Kirbys argued, “[i]f ‘instance and expense’ 
is too broadly or literally construed . . . the ‘test’ ceases to have any 
 
206 Id.; Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41, 143. 
207 Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321; Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141. 
208 Id. 
209 Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321. 
210 Id. 
211 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 54-55. 
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meaning or to differentiate ‘work for hire’ and non-’work for hire,’ as 
it applies equally to both.”212  The Kirbys’ argument was that a broad 
application of the test would create unfounded contradictions under 
the work for hire doctrine.213  For example, if a traditional employee 
creates a work outside the scope of his duties, and the employer still 
has the right to supervise it, the work would not be considered a work 
made for hire.214  However, if a court were to apply a broad applica-
tion of the instance and expense test to an independent contractor’s 
work, trace evidence of a work being commissioned at the hiring par-
ty’s instance, control, and expense may incline the court to find a 
work made for hire.215  How is it that a traditional employee could re-
tain ownership of a work just because it was outside the scope of his 
duties, but an independent contractor may not have ownership of the 
work because the hiring party exercised some control and paid a sum 
certain? 
The contradictions further demonstrate how a broad applica-
tion of the instance and expense test defies the common law princi-
ples of agency as embodied under both Acts.216  The instance and ex-
pense test is intended to prompt the courts to decide whether the 
hiring party’s actions displayed evidence of control similar to that of 
a traditional employer-employee relationship.  In articulating the fac-
tors of a traditional employer-employee relationship, courts must ad-
here to the law of agency.  Determining the scope of employment un-
der the law of agency suggests there must be existence of a 
“conventional master-servant relationship” in the parties’ situation.217  
Trace evidence of work being done at the hiring party’s instance and 
expense does not support a master-servant relationship.  If the test is 
applied too broadly, especially in cases of freelancers and independ-
ent contractors, it can be said that any work is a work made for 
hire.218 
If Marvel was decided under the standard established in Reid, 
several issues of fact would have survived summary judgment.  Kirby 
was a freelancer for Marvel and set his own hours, used his own sup-
 
212 Id. at 54. 
213 Id. at 54 n.5. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 54 n.5. 
217 Id. at 55 (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 
445, 452 (2003)); see also Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40. 
218 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 55. 
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plies, and had relatively broad discretion over his work.219  This cre-
ates a notion that Kirby was an independent contractor like the artist 
in Reid, rather than a traditional employee.220  However, Marvel 
would argue that when applying other elements of common law 
agency, Marvel retained some type of editorial control and the parties 
maintained an extensive working relationship.221  Although there is 
evidence supporting both arguments, Kirby as an independent con-
tractor and Kirby as a traditional employee working within the scope 
of employment, it is more likely that Kirby would be considered a 
traditional employee.  Because of Marvel and Kirby’s ongoing rela-
tionship, and Kirby’s consistent dedication to producing work within 
Marvel themes, Kirby was continuously acting as an employee within 
the scope of his employment at Marvel every time he sketched a new 
work. 
These arguments point the conclusion that the instance and 
expense test cannot be applied too broadly without risking the loss of 
its credibility.  Although the outcome in Marvel would most likely be 
the same if articulated under the Reid standard, the broad application 
of the instance and expense test creates a heavier burden for the artist.  
The test makes it more likely that hiring parties will prevail as long as 
the hiring party gathers some evidence of the hiring party’s control 
over the creation of the work.  The test needs to be narrowly applied, 
and the hiring party must present consistent and compelling evidence 
in order to show the relationship resembled a traditional employer-
employee relationship. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This note demonstrates the importance of the work for hire 
doctrine in determining ownership rights of copyrighted works.  Un-
der both the 1909 Act and the current Copyright Act of 1976, the 
work for hire doctrine is guided by the law of agency in order to de-
termine whether a person’s work was created on behalf of another.  
The instance and expense test further aids the courts in deciding 
whether the hiring party owns the work of a non-traditional employ-
ee.  The application of the work for hire doctrine is crucial because 
whoever is deemed the owner of the work is the one who stands to 
 
219 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 125-26. 
220 Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53. 
221 Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141. 
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benefit from the work’s earnings.  This means an original artist may 
have no say in terminating the purportedly assigned rights because he 
may not have been the owner of those rights all along.  Especially in 
today’s world of multi-million dollar derivative works, an artist may 
stand to lose those potential earnings due to the application of the 
doctrine.  In order to ensure an efficient ruling, the work for hire doc-
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